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INTRODUCTION
Sovereignty in the United States is uniquely intertwined with
its founding document. An important part of the Constitution is
the definition and protection of individual rights, which is a sign of
the government’s authority and responsibility for the nation’s
people.1 A more important aspect of sovereignty, however, rests in
the Constitution’s creation of the national government, the def-
inition of its powers, and the limits thereon. The Constitution
channels the national government’s sovereignty through two
structures: the separation of powers, which organizes authority
within the national government;2 and federalism, which distrib-
utes power between the national government and the states.3 One
need not subscribe to Justice Sutherland’s theory in United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.—that the federal government must
possess all sovereign powers available to  any nation-state4—to
agree that the Constitution, at the very least, grants to the federal
government many powers traditionally associated with national
sovereignty.5 These powers include the power to enact and
enforce domestic laws,6 make war,7 reach international agree-
1. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-VI, VIII-X, XIV-XV, XIX.
2. See id. art. I, § 1 (granting the legislative power to Congress); id. art. II, § 1 (giving the
executive power to the President); id. art. III, § 1 (vesting the courts with judicial power).
Collectively these are the “vesting clauses.”
3. See id. amend. X (retaining for the states and people those powers not explicitly
granted to the federal government).
4. 299 U.S. 304, 316-18 (1936). For more recent discussion, see Bradford R. Clark,
Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1295-99 (1996);
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3-7
(2002); Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 379, 379-87 (2000).
5. For classic criticism of Justice Sutherland’s opinion, see David M. Levitan, The
Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467,
478-90 (1946); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An
Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 28-32 (1973). 
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (stating that Congress holds legislative power); id. art. I, § 7
(describing procedure by which bills become law); id. art. II, § 1 (explaining that the President
holds executive power). 
7. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-12 (granting to Congress the power to declare war and raise and
support armies); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (naming the President as Commander-in-Chief of armed
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ments,8 and regulate international commerce.9 The Constitution
often addresses these powers through the structures of the separa-
tion of powers and federalism. Separation of powers dictates, for
example, that the power to make war is divided between Congress
and the President but that the power to make treaties is shared
between the executive and the Senate.10 As a matter of federalism,
the Constitution prohibits the states from making war and treaties
and from regulating international commerce.11
Globalization does not directly pressure these structures. A
nation could respond to the growing interconnectedness of the in-
ternational economy by doing nothing, and its constitutional struc-
tures would remain unaffected. But it is the natural, and perhaps
inevitable, reflex of nations to try to regulate globalization’s effects.
It is this attempt by governments to expand their regulatory reach
in response to globalization that creates distortions in the constitu-
tional structure and, in turn, poses challenges to American sover-
eignty. 
Increased cross-border human activity has led to more frequent
international cooperation.12 Take pollution, for example. Pollution
crosses national boundaries, contaminates global commons such as
the seas, and may even lead to a rise in world temperatures. A
single nation cannot undertake unilateral action to successfully
regulate pollution of this kind, and international cooperation would
suffer from free riders: nations that benefit from the reduction in
pollution but refuse to contribute resources or bear any costs to
improve the environment. Similar problems are faced by efforts to
combat international terrorist groups, control the international drug
trade, or stop the spread of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons
technologies.13
forces). 
8. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (permitting the President to make treaties with advice and consent
of the Senate).
9. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations).
10. See supra note 4.
11. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 11 (discussing congressional power to declare war); id. art.
I, § 10, cl. 3 (prohibiting state warmaking). 
12. See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
13. See, e.g., Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature
434 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:431
To reap the benefits of collective action, international cooperation
is likely to take forms that resemble those of the American adminis-
trative state. An international regulatory regime generally will need
to reach all activity, regardless of each individual nation’s internal
hierarchy of authority. In order to regulate global warming suc-
cessfully, for example, the Kyoto accords must be able to reach all
forms of energy use that produce carbon emissions.14 The Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) formally regulates all chemicals, no
matter their use, source, or location.15 This sweeping reach usually
combines with a permanent international organization that is
empowered to settle disputes over the agreement between inter-
ested nations.16 The organization will often aid implementation by
issuing regulations that adapt the regime to new circumstances
or delegate authority.17 Under the United Nations Charter, the
Security Council can call upon member states to use any necessary
means,  including the use of force, against a threat to interna-
tional peace and security.18 The World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreement establishes a dispute settlement body that hears claims
by one nation against another’s alleged trade violations.19 The
International Criminal Court brings prosecutions for human rights
violations that member states cannot or will not properly inves-
tigate on their own.20 We do not exaggerate the extent of global
governance currently in place. Nations still control the reality of
world politics, but emerging forms of international cooperation are
determining the future of international law and setting the outlines
for expansion in international organizations.21
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
14. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 12.
15. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter CWC].
16. See, e.g., id. art. VIII.
17. See, e.g., id. Verification Annex, pt. 2, para. 27.
18. U.N. Charter arts. 41-43.
19. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
Apr 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
20. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter ICC Statute].
21. See Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations:
New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 83-87 (2000); John C. Yoo, The New
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Although relatively new to the international scene, these forms
and orders should sound familiar to students of the American
administrative state. Just as new international regimes seek more
pervasive regulation of garden-variety conduct, so too did the New
Deal seek national control over private economic decisions that had
once rested within the control of the states. The Kyoto accords, for
example, had their counterpart in the federal government’s efforts
to control the production of every bushel of wheat on every Ameri-
can farm, as discussed in Wickard v. Filburn.22 The new interna-
tional courts and entities have their counterparts in the New Deal’s
commissions and independent bodies, which were created to remove
politics from administration in favor of technical expertise.23 To
remain neutral, these international bodies must have officials who
are free from the control of any individual nation. Similarly, the
New Deal witnessed the creation of a slew of alphabet agencies
whose officials could not be removed by the President.24 The New
Deal’s stretching of constitutional doctrine sparked a confrontation
between President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and the Supreme
Court, which initially espoused a narrower and less flexible vision
of federal power and the role of administrative agencies.25 Without
a theory that allows for an accommodation of international policy
demands with the U.S. constitutional system, these new forms of
Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the
Appointments Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 95-96 (1998).
22. 317 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1942).
23. MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 36
(Greenwood Press 1977) (1955) (“The Progressives had an abiding faith in regulation,
expertness, and the capacity of American government to make rational decisions provided
experts in the administrative agencies could remain free from partisan political
considerations.”); MARC ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSITION 44 (1993)
(describing how independent regulatory bodies were “envisioned as an institution capable of
compensating for the shortcomings of the ‘political’ institutions of American government”).
24. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690-93 (1988); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 629, 631-32 (1935); 5 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 668-81 (1938) (discussing reorganization of the executive branch according to the
report of Committee on Administrative Management).
25. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 313-17 (1936) (voiding laws
regulating the coal industry); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (voiding the
Agricultural Adjustment Act and several other pieces of legislation); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (voiding the National Industrial Recovery
Act).
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international cooperation may well produce an analogous collision
with constitutional law.
I. THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTION
Developing such a theory requires a baseline for the regulation
of normal domestic affairs. The Constitution relies on two main
structures to regulate and limit the exercise of governmental power:
federalism and the separation of powers. Federalism, in our view,
encompasses two interlinked authoritative bodies: a national
government that exercises limited, enumerated powers, and states
that retain sovereignty over the great mass of everyday affairs.
By contrast, the separation of powers allocates authority within
the national government over the powers delegated to it by the
Constitution.
A. Federalism and the Separation of Powers
Although the Constitution mentions neither federalism nor the
separation of powers in its text, scholars and government officials
have understood from the start that both principles lay at the very
core of the American government. The Federalist Papers extensively
described the various provisions of the Constitution that conform to
both structures.26 They pointed, for example, to Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution to show that the federal government’s powers
would be limited, though obviously broader in scope than those of
the Articles of Confederation.27 Opponents urged Americans against
ratification because they argued, in part, that the Constitution did
not contain even more forceful protections for federalism and the
separation of powers. In defending the Constitution, James Madison
argued that the government was “neither wholly national nor
wholly federal,” but a mixture.28 “In its foundation, it is federal, not
national”—in other words, the Constitution required the consent of
26. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (separation of powers), NOS.
14, 45 (James Madison) (federalism), NO. 51, (James Madison) (separation of powers).
27. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
28. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 242 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
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the states.29 “[I]n the sources from which the ordinary powers of the
Government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national”
—that is, the House of Representatives represented the majority
of the American people as a whole, but the Senate gave the
states equal representation, while the Electoral College made the
President a product of both.30 “[I]n the operation of these powers, it
is national, not federal”—indeed, the Constitution’s powers directly
regulated individuals, and not the states.31 “[I]n the extent of them,
again, it is federal, not national”—finally, supremacy over some
subjects rested with the national government, and some with the
states.32
If federalism refers to a political system that allocates authority
between governmental bodies that coexist within the same territory,
then the question of federalism was one the British Empire and
its colonies had struggled with for some time.33 The American
Revolution did not truly solve the challenge of distributing power
between the national and state governments, and it was the dele-
gates to the Philadelphia Convention who finally attempted to solve
the problem. The proposed Constitution that resulted from the
Convention, however, is notable not just for its enumeration of new
national powers, but also for its rejection of efforts to reduce the role
of the states in the national political system.34
The Constitution vested Congress with numerous powers that it
had lacked under the Articles of Confederation. The national gov-
ernment now could impose taxes and duties, borrow and spend
money, regulate interstate and international commerce, conduct
foreign relations, establish a military, control naturalization and
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 242-43.
32. Id. at 243.
33. See, e.g., ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
7-16 (1935); Alison L. LaCroix, The Authority for Federalism: Madison’s Negative and the
Origins of Federal Ideology, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 451, 455-57, 464-72 (2010); Andrew C.
McLaughlin, The Background of American Federalism, 12 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 215, 215-19
(1918); see generally JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES,
1607-1788, at 79-104 (W.W. Norton & Co. paperback ed. 1990) (1986).
34. For discussion of federalism and the framing, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 161-202 (1996).
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bankruptcy, grant patents and copyrights, and create the lower
federal courts and the post office.35 Congress had the power to gov-
ern the territories and admit new states into the Union, and it had
an important role in amending the Constitution.36 The Constitution
prohibited the states from interfering in matters of foreign relations,
war, and interstate commerce.37 The Federalists also succeeded in
creating a federal government that could act directly upon indi-
viduals, without relying upon the intervention of the states. As
Alexander Hamilton argued in The Federalist No. 15, “[t]he great
and radical vice” of the Articles of Confederation lay “in the prin-
ciple of Legislation for states or governments, in their corporate or
collective capacities, and as contradistinguished from the indi-
viduals of whom they consist.”38 With the creation of an independent
executive and judicial branch and the elimination of any state veto
over legislation, the national government would be able to enact,
execute, and adjudicate its laws independently and directly. With
the authority to enact laws “necessary and proper” to the execution
of the government’s powers, Congress could also claim a certain
breadth of implied powers.39 After the Civil War, the Reconstruction
Amendments expanded Congress’s powers to enforce constitutional
guarantees of antislavery, equal protection and due process, and
voting rights against the states.40 
The new government, however, would be neither a consolidated
nation nor a confederation of sovereign nations. Instead, it would
constitute, in Madison’s classic phrase, a “compound republic,”
partly federal and partly national.41 “The proposed Constitution
therefore, ... is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal
Constitution, but a composition of both,” Madison wrote.42 Despite
Article I, Section 8’s enumeration of new national powers vested in
Congress and Article I, Section 10’s prohibitions on state action,
35. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
36. See U.S. CONST. arts. IV-V.
37. See id. art. I. § 10.
38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 28, at 103 (Alexander Hamilton).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (the Necessary and Proper Clause).
40. Id. amends. XIII-XV. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 389-481 (2d ed. 2005). 
41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 28, at 320 (James Madison).
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 28, at 242 (James Madison).
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the Constitution clearly accommodated the independent sover-
eignty of the states over most affairs in everyday life.43 In The
Federalist No. 39, Madison declared that the federal government’s
“jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only,” whereas
the states continued to possess “a residuary and inviolable sover-
eignty over all other objects.”44 Aside from the written exceptions to
their powers in the Constitution, the states emerged from the
Philadelphia Convention with their sovereignty intact and protected
by the mechanisms—in particular, the Senate and judicial review
—built into the national government.45
American federalism, as enshrined in the Constitution’s struc-
ture, makes the federal government one of limited, enumerated
powers. All powers that are not encompassed in the Constitution’s
grants of power are left to the states and the people. As Madison
wrote in The Federalist No. 45: “The powers delegated by the pro-
posed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous
and indefinite.”46 This proposition is clearly articulated in Article I,
Section 1 of the Constitution, which gives to Congress only the “leg-
islative [p]owers herein granted,”47 and in the Tenth Amendment,
which declares that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people.”48 Only states may exer-
cise a “police power,” the general legislative authority to regulate on
any subject not expressly prohibited by the federal Constitution.49
At the Philadelphia Convention, the Framers rejected an early pro-
posal to give Congress a broader, unenumerated legislative power
to make law on matters on which the states were “incompetent.”50
43. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 28, at 242 (James Madison).
45. On the importance of the Senate as the representative of the states in federal
lawmaking, see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79
TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1342-46 (2001).
46. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 28, at 289 (James Madison).
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
48. Id. amend. X.
49. The Supreme Court first mentioned the term “police power” in 1827, when it held that
“the police power ... unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the States.” Brown
v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443 (1827); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X.
50. For discussion of this proposal, see Donald H. Regan, How To Think About the Federal
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Changing times, particularly the expansion of the national econ-
omy and the growth of the size and tax revenues of the federal
government, have historically allowed the national government to
expand its reach. Following the New Deal, the Supreme Court read
the Commerce Clause so broadly as to allow the federal government
to control not just the national economy, in terms of wages and
hours, but also socioeconomic issues, such as racial discrimination
in employment.51 Moreover, using its Spending Clause powers,
Congress offers the states large sums to follow national standards
in education, health care, and other issues that lie beyond its power
of direct regulation.52 According to the Supreme Court, Congress
cannot use its spending power to force states to violate the Constitu-
tion or to withhold so much money for relatively small conditions
that its dictates become “coercive.”53 Nonetheless, the states retain
control over most areas of daily life. States enforce their own
criminal laws, subject to the Due Process54 and Equal Protection
Clauses,55 and set the rules of property, contract, torts, and family
law, among many other areas.56 State governments dwarf the size
and ability of the federal government to enforce regulation.57 
The separation of powers deals with the horizontal, rather than
the vertical, allocation of authority. Like federalism, the separation
of powers was, in practice, an American innovation. At the time
of the Revolution, Great Britain was governed by an unwritten
“mixed” constitution that shared power among different social
classes—the House of Commons representing the people, the House
of Lords representing the aristocracy, and the Crown representing
the King.58 The separation of powers in its pure form existed
Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 555-
57 (1995) (arguing that the enumeration of Congress’s powers was meant merely to
comprehend all of the situations in which states were incompetent).
51. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
52. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
53. See, e.g., id. at 211.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881, 885-87 (1986).
57. Id. at 899.
58. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 40, at 4.
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primarily in the minds of John Locke and Baron de Montesquieu.59
Locke defined the legislative power as the power to establish rules
of conduct, whereas the executive was a “power always in being”
whose responsibility was to execute the laws.60 Foreign affairs such
as war and peace, according to Locke, constituted a separate,
“federative” power.61 Although distinct, the federative power was
almost always vested in the executive because foreign affairs are
“much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive
laws.”62 Montesquieu agreed that legislation ought to determine the
rules of conduct that citizens owe to one another or speak in the
“voice of the nation,”63 whereas foreign affairs would fall to “the
executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations.”64
Although Montesquieu’s warning that tyranny would begin when
the executive, legislative, and judicial powers did not remain dis-
tinct inspired the Framers, he was writing about an imaginary
constitution and not the British Constitution as it truly existed.65
Nonetheless, Blackstone maintained this distinction between the
powers over war and peace, which were vested in the Crown, and
the regulation of domestic conduct, which was within the sole
authority of Parliament.66
It was not until the American Constitution that the separation of
powers was attempted in practice. Like federalism, the separation
of powers does not appear by name in any specific clause of the
Constitution, though it is inferred from the Constitution’s basic
structure. The fundamental principle is that there are three types
of governmental power—executive, legislative, and judicial—and
that those functions should be exclusively assigned to the President,
Congress, and the judiciary, respectively. The Constitution makes
this clear in the first clauses of Articles I, II, and III establishing the
59. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§ 143-47 (J.W. Gough
ed., Basil Blackwell 1948) (1689); BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151
(Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1966) (1748).
60. LOCKE, supra note 59, §§ 143-44.
61. Id. §§ 145-47.
62. Id.
63. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 59, at 151.
64. Id.
65. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 91-92 (Liberty
Fund 1998) (1967).
66. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *245.
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federal government; these clauses vest the legislative power in
Congress,67 the executive power in the President,68 and the judicial
power in the federal courts.69 These articles follow a general
principle of separation of powers: Congress receives all of the federal
power to legislate the rules of domestic conduct; the President
executes the laws and enjoys a large role in foreign and military
affairs; and the courts only decide federal cases and controversies.70
As with federalism, opponents to ratification claimed that the
new Constitution violated “the political maxim that the legis-
lative, executive and judiciary departments ought to be separate
and distinct,”71 a principle they received from “the celebrated
Montesquieu.”72 In response, Federalists claimed fealty to the
separation of powers. “The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive and judiciary in the same hands,” Madison wrote in The
Federalist No. 47, “whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny.”73 Madison, however, argued that the
separation of powers did not require a strict separation of the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers from each other, but
instead allowed for some branches to have a hand in the operations
of another.74 Montesquieu “did not mean that these departments
ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of
each other.”75 Rather, he meant “that where the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole
power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free
constitution are subverted.”76 Thus, according to Madison, the
Constitution could allow the President a qualified veto, or the
Senate to sit as a court of impeachment, or the Senate to approve
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
68. Id. art. II, § 1.
69. Id. art. III, § 1.
70. See id. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1.
71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 28, at 297 (James Madison).
72. Id. at 298.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 299.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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treaties and nominees for executive office without violating the
separation of powers.77
The Constitution, therefore, does not embody a pure separation
of powers along the lines envisioned by Montesquieu or Locke or
suggested by the vesting clauses standing alone. In specific areas,
the Constitution inserts checks and balances into the basic plan.
The war power, for example, had rested solely in the hands of the
Crown and was considered part of the executive powers by Locke
and Montesquieu.78 The Constitution, however, divides the war
powers between Congress, which has the power to raise and fund
armies and declare war,79 and the President, who is Commander-in-
Chief.80 Article II’s Appointment81 and Treaty82 Clauses give the
Senate the right to reject presidential nominations or proposals,
while Article I grants the President a conditional veto over legis-
lation.83 On the other hand, the vesting clauses of Articles II and
III—in contrast to the specific, enumerated limits on Congress in
Article I—have been understood to give the Presidency and the
federal courts powers of an executive or judicial nature that are not
specifically enumerated. Thus, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the President’s executive power to include the authority to remove
subordinate U.S. officers, except in highly unusual cases of public
need for independence.84 The Court’s own right of judicial review
itself is nowhere specifically granted in the constitutional text, but
has been inferred from Article III.85
This structure of separate and independent branches of govern-
ment, overlaid with checks and balances, can be violated in several
ways: one branch can try to aggrandize its own power beyond its
constitutional limits; one branch can interfere with another’s ability
77. Id. at 300.
78. See W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 95-96 (1965); VILE,
supra note 65, at 108-10. See generally JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE
CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 30-142 (2005).
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-12.
80. Id. art. II, § 2.
81. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
82. Id.
83. Id. art. I, § 7. Additionally, the Vice President has the ability to cast a legislative vote
in the Senate in the case of a tie. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
84. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
85. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
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to perform its core constitutional functions; or two branches can
collude to expand their powers or those of another branch. Congress,
for example, would violate the separation of powers if it promul-
gated laws that actually decided cases between parties in court or
reopened final judgments.86 Under the separation of powers, how-
ever, the three branches of government are coordinate and inde-
pendent, in that one cannot prevent another from performing its
constitutionally assigned functions. Thus, the President cannot
exercise lawmaking authority without the delegation or approval of
Congress.87 Courts cannot decide hypothetical cases that necessitate
the review of law enforcement policies.88 
The interaction of the independent branches, as mediated by the
Constitution’s specific power-sharing provisions, has produced some
enduring principles. One of the earliest and most profound is that
of judicial review, articulated by the Supreme Court in the famous
case of Marbury v. Madison.89 Judicial review sprung from the basic
structural principle that the Constitution represents higher law,
superior to any act of the federal government. The agents of the
people could not use their delegated powers to supersede the
original terms of the founding document. No branch of government,
therefore, could act in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution,
even if that meant that a federal court had to refuse to obey an act
of Congress that violated the Constitution’s terms. The separation
of powers requires that the courts even refuse a congressional effort
to expand their jurisdiction, if it exceeds the maximum jurisdiction
set out by the Constitution. It also prohibits Congress from trans-
ferring certain federal cases from the jurisdiction of the courts to
86. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148 (1872).
87. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 585-89
(1952).
88. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-61 (1984); Lea
Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy”
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 297-98 (1979); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing
as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881-82
(1983).
89. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180. See generally John Harrison, The Constitutional
Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 VA. L. REV. 333 (1998); Saikrishna B. Prakash
& John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887 (2003); William W. Van
Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1.
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administrative agencies, lest judicial independence be threatened.90
Judicial independence, as clarified in other cases, also prohibits
Congress from reviewing or reopening final judgments or asking
judges to perform a nonjudicial function.91
The Constitution’s definition of the lawmaking process places
further restrictions on Congress. Article I, Section 7’s bicameralism
and presentment requirements prohibit Congress from regulating
the rights and duties of private citizens or other branches of govern-
ment except through the enactment of legislation.92 In INS v.
Chadha, the Court read this structure to prevent Congress from
reversing a decision by an administrative agency through the
exercise of a veto that passed in the House but did not go to the
President for signature.93 In Clinton v. New York, the Court held
that Article I, Section 7 prohibited the President from exercising a
line-item veto, which would have allowed the President to delete
individual line items before a new statute could take effect.94 It is
important to recognize that these cases do not just prevent the self-
interested expansion of Congress’s powers. In the line-item veto
case, for example, Congress improperly attempted to transfer power
from itself to the President.
Limits on Congress’s enactment of legislation, combined with
Article II’s vesting of the power to execute the laws in the President,
concentrates control over law enforcement in the executive branch—
much of which relies on the powers of appointment and removal.
The Appointments Clause gives the nomination of important federal
officers to the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
90. See Laurence Claus, The One Court that Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity,
Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59, 59 (2007) (“Congress’s Exceptions power does not
authorize jurisdiction stripping.”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364-65 (1953)
(recounting Congressionally created exceptions to the Court’s jurisdiction are only
Constitutional if they do not “destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court”); Lawrence
Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority To Regulate the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 44 (1981) (“An ‘exception’ implies a
minor deviation from a surviving norm; it is a nibble, not a bite.”); Laurence H. Tribe,
Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129, 135 (1981). 
91. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 225-26 (1995).
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
93. 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983).
94. 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998).
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and of inferior officers to the President, cabinet officers, or the
courts.95 It does not explain how officers of the United States may be
removed, but nonetheless, ever since the first Congress of 1789, the
removal power has generally been understood to rest with the
President. Power over the removal of inferior officers gives the
President control over the executive branch to ensure that he can
impose a uniform execution of federal law. The negative implication
is that the Appointments Clause also precludes the other branches
from appointing or removing important executive branch personnel,
because to do so would interfere with law enforcement by the
President. In Buckley v. Valeo, for example, the Court prohibited
Congress from appointing members of the Federal Elections
Commission, because it would have given Congress control over
officers who would enforce federal law.96 In Bowsher v. Synar, the
Court struck down a budget reduction act because it gave the
Comptroller General, an officer subject to removal by Congress, a
role in deciding on spending cuts.97
The Court, however, has allowed Congress to place conditions on
the President’s freedom to remove inferior officers if there is an
important public reason to clothe them in independence. Chief
Justice Taft explained the basic rule in Myers v. United States: the
removal of federal officers must reside with the President so he can
control the execution of federal law.98 But in Humphrey’s Executor
v. United States, the Court upheld restrictions on the removal of
the chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) because the
FTC performed “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” functions
that were not wholly executive in nature.99 Independent regulatory
agencies, apparently, could function outside the President’s direct
control. In Morrison v. Olson, the Court extended the concept of
independence to the special counsel statute, even though prosecu-
95. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash,
The President’s Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 578 (1994); Martin S. Flaherty,
The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1781 (1996); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 113 (1994).
96. 424 U.S. 1, 124-44 (1976) (per curiam).
97. 478 U.S. 714, 726-27, 736 (1986).
98. 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926).
99. 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935).
2011] GLOBALIZATION AND STRUCTURE 447
tion had long been considered a core executive power.100 The Court
upheld restrictions on the counsel’s removal because they did not
“impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty”
and because the need for independence when investigating the
White House and cabinet officers was sufficiently important.101 
Discussion of the appointment and removal powers shows that
although the Framers erected three independent branches of
government, they did not create “a hermetic division among the
Branches.”102 In general, the vesting of the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers in Congress, the President, and the courts
followed a separation of powers model, but the Constitution left
those terms undefined, thereby allowing for a certain amount of
pragmatic evolution in the forms of government.
B. Nationalization, Globalization, and the Constitution
The greatest strain on this framework, one in which these flexible
components of the Constitution were pressed beyond the breaking
point, occurred during the New Deal. In response to the Great
Depression, the Roosevelt administration and a large Democratic
majority in Congress wrought sweeping changes in the structure of
the Constitution.103 Constitutional law of the day was unprepared
for the national focus of economic regulation and the creation of a
powerful and independent administrative state. It had still kept to
the forms and orders of a relatively decentralized system of gov-
ernment that was unprepared for the New Deal’s demands for na-
tional regulation. Before examining how globalization is producing
a similar strain on our governmental structures today, we must first
understand how nationalization caused one of the most significant
constitutional conflicts in American history.
Nationalization of the American economy began in earnest at the
end of the Civil War. War had spurred the spread of a nationwide
transportation network: the transcontinental railroad was com-
100. 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988).
101. Id.
102. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989).
103. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 274-82 (1985); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 213-14 (1995).
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pleted in 1869, and the length of railroad tracks jumped from 30,000
miles in 1860 to 240,000 miles by World War I.104 Faster speeds and
sharp reductions in the cost of transportation throughout the
country laid the foundations for a national market in goods.
Railroads became the nation’s largest corporations and the biggest
investors in other industries, and they gave form to great national
trusts.105 A nationwide communications system had come a little
earlier, with the first transcontinental telegraph link in 1861106 and
the first transatlantic cable in 1866.107 After Alexander Graham
Bell’s invention of the telephone in 1876, AT&T installed over two
million telephones by 1905.108 Electricity networks spread in the
1870s, allowing for more efficient lighting and power generation.
The invention of steel led to demand for the mining of coal, the
development of oil, and greater industrial production.
Nationalization of the economy prompted two responses, one by
the private sector and one by the public. Railroads accelerated the
growth not just of transportation but also of the modern corporate
form, which quickly spread to other industries. Limited liability for
investors in common stock allowed corporate leaders to tap large
amounts of capital for expensive projects.109 Industrial corporations
began to pursue horizontal and vertical integration of their indus-
tries. By the end of the nineteenth century, large trusts had gained
monopoly control over different sectors of the economy. The first
great trust, John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil, was founded in
1870, and by the turn of the century it controlled about 90 percent
of all oil in the nation.110 U.S. Steel, created by J.P Morgan in 1901,
produced about two-thirds of all steel in the country.111 The private
104. KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 189 (1989).
105. See ALAN BRINKLEY, THE UNFINISHED NATION: A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 463-65 (4th ed. 2004).
106. See ROBERT LUTHER THOMPSON, WIRING A CONTINENT 368 (1947).
107. See ANNTERESA LUBRANO, THE TELEGRAPH: HOW TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION CAUSED
SOCIAL CHANGE 155 (1997).
108. N. AM. TELECOMMS. ASS’N, INDUSTRY BASICS: INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY,
STRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 1 (4th ed. 1991).
109. See BRINKLEY, supra note 105, at 464-65.
110. Id. at 465-66.
111. Id. at 465; see also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 361 (1977); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER:
1877-1920, at 187 (1967).
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sphere responded to industrialization and nationalization by thus
concentrating economic power.
The U.S. government began to address these developments with
national regulation. In 1887, Congress enacted the Interstate
Commerce Act to regulate national railroad rates,112 and in 1890 the
Sherman Antitrust Act prohibited anticompetitive monopolies.113
Neither law, however, saw much enforcement until the presidency
of Theodore Roosevelt. In the following decades, Congress attempted
to create the rudiments of administration to regulate the national
economy. It enacted more national regulation of the markets, such
as a ban on child labor and quality standards for foods and drugs.114
Efforts to regulate hours and wages, the securities markets, and old
age and disability stalled in Congress, however. Under Woodrow
Wilson, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 established the first
national banking system since Andrew Jackson had destroyed the
Second Bank of the United States.115 The Wilson administration also
bulked up the government’s resources to attack monopolies through
the Federal Trade Commission and the Clayton Antitrust Act.116
These efforts, which culminated in the New Deal, followed two
institutional patterns. First, the reach of regulation had to be na-
tional in scope. Corporations could escape state regulations simply
by relocating their headquarters or operations to other states with
more lenient standards. New Deal legislation, for example, set
employment hours and wages throughout the nation to ensure
uniformity and to discourage states from a destructive race to the
bottom.117 National regulations could avoid the profound, and
sometimes unforeseeable, effects of uncoordinated, conflicting local
112. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
113. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (2006)).
114. Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of 1916, ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675, invalidated by Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3015, 34 Stat. 768.
115. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
116. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (2006)); Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006)).
117. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006)).
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regulation. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, for example,
allowed the Agriculture Department to set production quotas for all
wheat grown in the nation, no matter how small the farm.118 If all
small farms were exempt from the statute, they could produce
enough wheat in the aggregate to undermine the federal effort to
regulate the quantity available on the national market.119 When
markets were more fragmented, economic activity in one state or
region might not have such an immediate impact. The communica-
tions and transportation revolutions allowed the decisions of even
small producers or buyers to have national effects. Because the
scope of economic activity had become national, effective govern-
ment regulation had to extend its reach to keep pace.
Second, government institutions had to change to come to grips
with the complexity and speed of the new markets. Instead of en-
acting extensive schedules of regulations itself, Congress dele-
gated broad swaths of authority to the executive branch. A grant of
power to the administrative state often came with few stringent
standards for exercising that power. The Interstate Commerce
Act, for example, gave the Interstate Commerce Commission the
task of setting “reasonable and just” railroad rates.120 The Sherman
Antitrust Act declared as illegal “every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy” that was “in restraint of
trade or commerce.”121 Political scientists have identified several
reasons for such broad delegations. One reason is transaction costs.
As an elected body of 535 Representatives and Senators, Congress
suffers from severe difficulties in deliberating, negotiating, and
reaching agreement because of its large size.122 The second reason
is technical expertise. Congress does not have the resources to de-
velop the knowledge and judgment to solve difficult policy problems
in technical and scientific areas.123 The third reason is uncertainty.
Congress will delegate policy choices in areas of unpredictability
118. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119 (1942).
119. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128.
120. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379, 379.
121. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209.
122. ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 171-77 (2000).
123. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 101-02 (2003).
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and high stakes, such as foreign affairs and war, because individual
legislators do not want to be blamed for making the wrong policy
choice.124 The fourth reason is political accountability. Congressmen,
who are primarily interested in reelection, will not risk taking
stands on controversial issues when political opposition will result
no matter which option they choose.125 Reelection will be less dif-
ficult for a legislator to achieve if an agency makes the trade-offs
between gas mileage and traffic fatalities or if courts decide abortion
policy.
Independence accompanied these broad delegations of authority.
Presidents had once seen agencies such as the Post Office primarily
as a source of patronage, which buttressed the decentralized, party-
based nature of American politics. Agencies under these new nation-
al regulatory statutes served a different objective—they were to
take partisan politics out of government action. It was understand-
able that Congress would be reluctant to delegate broad rule-
making authority to agencies that were under the direct control of
its constitutional rival, the President. A constitutional mechanism
that provided the agencies with independence from executive control
would increase Congress’s ability to influence rulemaking decisions.
But Presidents since George Washington had exercised direct policy
control over the executive branch agencies through their power to
replace subordinate officials with ones who would carry out their
wishes. In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed that
Congress could not place limitations on the President’s authority to
remove executive branch officers, in that case, a postmaster.126
Congress later sought to insulate the new commissions and boards
from political influence by restricting the ability of the President to
remove their officers except for “good cause,” which usually meant
a violation of federal law or serious malfeasance in office.127
We should be clear that we take no normative position here on
whether the New Deal’s reworking of the administrative state was
desirable. As a matter of consequences, economic historians gener-
ally believe that other causes such as an expansionary monetary
124. Id. at 103-05.
125. Id. at 108-10.
126. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
127. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685, 691 (1988).
452 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:431
policy and the fiscal stimulus in the lead-up to World War II, rather
than New Deal programs, ended the Great Depression.128 Nonethe-
less, our point is not whether the New Deal was effective at bringing
the United States out of the worst economic slump in its history but
whether it effectively responded to nationalization of the economy
and society with regulation of similar scope. It seems apparent that
it did. The New Deal established federal regulation of the national
economy in many areas, which expanded after World War II to cover
civil rights, the environment, and health care. In order to regulate
an economy of such scope and complexity effectively, Congress
delegated broad authority to independent agencies that stressed
technical expertise over partisan politics.
The parallels with the move toward international regulation are
striking. Globalization has produced an impact on the economy and
society that is equally as remarkable today as nationalization was
more than a century ago. Just as progress in transportation and
communication welded together states and regions into a single
national market in the nineteenth century, shipping advances, jet
air transport, and the Internet have created a global market in
many goods and services today. Billions of dollars move instanta-
neously between national stock markets, and the events and policies
in one developed country can quickly influence the economy of
another. As one example, witness the speed with which the recent
American credit crisis spread to the financial markets of the other
developed economies.129 Problems such as pollution, disease, ter-
rorism, and crime have also become global, moving through the
same fast channels of transportation and communications as inter-
national trade and capital.
International efforts to regulate the effects of globalization, both
the good and the bad, similarly resemble the New Deal’s twin
characteristics—the breadth of regulation and the delegation to
independent regulators. As with nationalization, effective solutions
need to be global. Efforts to coordinate government policies on global
128. See Christina D. Romer, What Ended the Great Depression?, 52 J. ECON. HIST. 757
(1992).
129. See generally Saule T. Omarova, The New Crisis for the New Century: Some
Observations on the “Big-Picture” Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 13 N.C.
BANKING INST. 157 (2009).
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warming through the Kyoto accords provide a good example.
Imposing industrial emission standards to lower pollution will have
limited effect if companies can relocate to jurisdictions with less
stringent requirements.130 A truly global solution would require
regulation of the carbon-based pollution of every country on the
planet. Whether in the form of quotas or taxes or credits, govern-
ment standards would have to press beyond the limits of the
national government’s powers to regulate the market to reach
conduct that tends to be private or noncommercial. Setting emis-
sions targets for large industrial enterprises may capture a large
portion of energy use, but to effectively regulate its total output, a
nation would have to regulate home activity, such as heating,
cooking, and transportation, as well.
International cooperation has also adopted the forms of dom-
estic regulations in the establishment of regulatory institutions.
Multilateral treaties have created institutions, independent of any
nation, to verify compliance with agreements, resolve disputes, and
develop proposals for their own extensions. These institutions
usually do not depend on any state parties for their decisions,
though they could call upon third-party nations for help. As broad
multilateral agreements have spread, independent international
organizations (IOs) have grown with them. IOs address the likeli-
hood that some treaty parties will not obey an agreement or will
interfere with verification. They can also help overcome the temp-
tation to cheat for short-term advantage, ruining the greater long-
term benefits of cooperation—what social scientists call the prison-
ers’ dilemma. An IO can also help build trust between state parties
by vesting implementation in a neutral, impartial entity that is not
beholden to any single nation or alliance. 
The Chemical Weapons Convention illustrates these develop-
ments in the structure of international agreements and organ-
izations.131 Unlike other arms control agreements, which place
numerical caps on arsenals or limit the use of weapons in combat,
the CWC seeks to ban the development, production, and stockpiling
130. For discussion of this race-to-the-bottom thesis in domestic environmental law, see
generally Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation:
A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997).
131. See CWC, supra note 15.
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of an entire class of weapons. If the treaty only regulated weapons
arsenals, it would not raise any innovative questions of arms control
agreement design. The problem with chemical weapons, and indeed
with other forms of weapons of mass destruction, is that the
chemicals and the facilities used to produce them have dual uses.
Chemicals that have civilian uses, such as pesticides, plastics, and
manufacturing, can have military uses as well. A nation that seeks
to build a covert chemical weapons capability or arsenal could easily
disguise its activities behind a civilian-use front.
To be fully effective, the CWC must regulate not just national
stockpiles of chemical weapons, but also the private chemical indus-
try that produces “toxic chemicals” or their “precursors.”132 Thus,
industrial chemical facilities, as well as the public weapons arse-
nals of state signatories to the treaty, fall within the Convention’s
scope.133 Chemicals that have been used as weapons are banned.134
Facilities that produce chemicals that are toxic or are immediate
precursors to weapons, but are also used for commercial purposes,
are subject to on-site verification and monitoring.135 States are to
enact regulations and criminal penalties for anyone who violates the
ban on the possession or production of the most dangerous chemi-
cals.136 To provide full coverage, the CWC must go even further
than regulation of major industrial chemical facilities. A laboratory
of no more than 1600 square feet in size can manufacture 100 tons
of chemical weapons in one year.137 Successfully regulating chemical
weapons requires that the treaty reach all sites that use and
produce civilian chemicals, in addition to the usual military and
defense contractor sites that are the subject of most arms control
agreements. According to the Office of Technology Assessment, the
United States alone has potentially 10,000 sites that qualify for
inspection under the treaty.138
132. See id. arts. II, VI.
133. Id. art. V.
134. Id. art. IV.
135. Id. art. V; see also Kathleen C. Bailey, Problems with the Chemical Weapons
Convention, in SHADOWS AND SUBSTANCE: THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 17, 23-24
(Benoit Morel & Kyle Olson eds., 1993).
136. CWC, supra note 15, art. XI.
137. See Bailey, supra note 135, at 20.
138. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: EFFECTS ON THE
U.S. CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 15 (1993).
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In order to advance compliance, the treaty regime relies upon the
second pillar of modern regulation—the creation of an independent
institution.139 In order to verify compliance, the CWC requires that
state parties allow personnel of the treaty organization to conduct
surprise “challenge” inspections of any location on their territory.140
The CWC creates an IO, the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons, which has a Technical Secretariat in charge of
identifying targets and conducting challenge inspections.141 Under
the treaty, the Secretariat has the right to enter a nation and
receive unimpeded access to any chemical site, its personnel, and
its records. The Secretariat’s decisions are not reviewable by any
domestic governmental body.142 This independence is critical to the
CWC’s ability to monitor compliance, particularly by states that
might be conducting illicit chemical weapons activity. It builds trust
between the state parties by vesting the authority over verification
in a neutral entity outside the control of any single nation. Agreeing
to enforcement by an independent organization may even be a way
for nations to signal that they can be trusted to comply with the
agreement in the future. The independence of the organization from
national control or influence thus becomes crucial for a nation to
meaningfully bind itself.
II. REGULATION AND GLOBALIZATION
History suggests that the movement toward international regu-
lation will place stresses on the Constitution’s structural frame-
works. New Deal innovations placed similar stresses on the existing
constitutional law of the day, which produced one of the sharpest
constitutional conflicts among the President, the Congress, and the
Supreme Court in American history. Only after the President im-
posed extreme political pressure on the courts did they alter
constitutional law doctrines on federalism and the separation of
powers to accommodate the New Deal’s expanded administrative
139. See CWC, supra note 15, art. VIII.
140. See id. art. IX, paras. 8-25.
141. Id. art. VIII.
142. Id.
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state.143 Constitutional law had not come to grips with the effects of
nationalization and the government’s efforts to regulate them.
Unless we have a better grasp of the current and potential effects of
globalization on constitutional law, a similar fate might be in store
for us.
To understand the tension between globalization and constitu-
tional law, it is worthwhile to examine the confrontation that
occurred in response to nationalization. In the period between
Reconstruction and the New Deal, the Supreme Court developed
several doctrines that limited the public’s ability to regulate private
business conduct. First, the Court limited the national government’s
power to regulate interstate commerce, which is today’s great fount
of federal authority. In response to the Progressive Era’s effort to
regulate business, the Court held that Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers could not reach manufacturing or agriculture within a state.
These matters, according to the Court’s theory of dual federalism,
were reserved for state control. In the 1895 case of United States v.
E.C. Knight Co., the Court blocked the Justice Department’s at-
tempt to use the antitrust laws to break up a trust that controlled
virtually all sugar refineries in the country.144 The majority rea-
soned that the sugar refining occurred wholly within the borders of
individual states and so did not constitute interstate commerce,
which meant it was subject to the “police powers” of the states.145 In
1918, the Court, in Hammer v. Dagenhart, struck down a federal
law that prohibited the interstate transportation of goods made with
child labor.146 Even though the federal ban applied only when the
product moved across state lines, the Court declared that “the pro-
duction of articles, intended for interstate commerce, is a matter of
local regulation.”147
The Court later enforced its distinction between commerce, which
could be regulated by the national government, and manufacturing
and production, which remained within the authority of the states
and beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause. After Hammer v.
143. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 203-04
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
144. 156 U.S. 1, 9 (1895).
145. Id. at 16-18.
146. 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918).
147. Id.
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Dagenhart, Congress attacked child labor by imposing a 10 percent
excise tax on all such goods.148 The Court struck down the law, even
though it was enacted by a different power, on the ground that
Congress could not use a tax to achieve a prohibited end.149 The
Court imposed parallel limits on Congress’s power to tax and spend
and on its regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause.
The Court matched its limits on federal authority to regulate the
economy with similar restrictions on the states. Even though the
states enjoyed the police power to regulate anything not touched by
the Constitution’s grants of power to the national government, the
federal courts read the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment150 to place limits on the states. These limits also ap-
plied to the federal government pursuant to the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.151 In the most famous example of the courts’
limits on state governments, Lochner v. New York, the Court struck
down a state law that limited the hours that bakers could work.152
Over the memorable dissent of Justice Holmes,153 the majority
concluded that the Constitution protected the individual right of the
bakers to contract to work as much as they liked.154 Government
could not redistribute income within an industry, which was the
effect of the law, nor infringe the right of free labor.
A third doctrine posed a threat to the administrative state itself.
Under the nondelegation doctrine, the Court had held that Congress
could not delegate “legislative power” to the administrative agen-
cies.155 In Field v. Clark, the Court upheld a trade law that allowed
the President to restore tariffs if a foreign nation did not provide
reciprocal reductions for American imports.156 The Court declared
that the fact that “Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the
President” is “universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitu-
148. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 34-35 (1922).
149. Id. at 43-44.
150. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
151. Id. amend. V.
152. 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905).
153. See id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 64-65 (majority opinion).
155. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
156. Id. at 662-63.
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tion.”157 In Field, the Court found that no unconstitutional delega-
tion had occurred because the statute specified when the President
could restore tariff rates.158 “He was the mere agent of the law-
making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which
its expressed will was to take effect.”159 In other words, the
nondelegation doctrine would be satisfied if Congress specified
factual circumstances in which the executive branch could exercise
delegated authority, but would bar open-ended provisions that
granted power without any standards as to its use. The Court did
not invalidate the federal law, but it made clear that the legislature
could only delegate power to the agencies to apply Congress’s prin-
ciples to specific cases, not to make the policies themselves.
FDR’s efforts to impose regulation on the national economy came
into direct conflict with standard constitutional doctrine as it
existed in 1932. The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) did
not just ban a single product or manufacturing process; indeed, it
placed all industrial production in the nation under federal regu-
lation.160 The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) did the same with
farms,161 and a third act concerned the coal industry.162 The second
wave of New Deal laws, such as the National Labor Relations Act163
and the Public Utility Holding Company Act164 set uniform rules on
the activities of unions and utilities, while the Social Security
Act created a nationwide system of unemployment compensation
and pensions.165 New Deal lawyers believed that the Interstate
Commerce Clause should be interpreted to include almost all
economic activity in the nation because almost all goods produced
in a state traveled through the channels of interstate commerce.
157. Id. at 692.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 693.
160. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, invalidated by A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935).
161. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at U.S.C.
§ 601-27 (2006)), invalidated by United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68-78 (1936).
162. Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991.
163. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006)).
164. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803.
165. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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They reasoned that the states were powerless to reverse the collapse
of the national economy of the Great Depression.166 
But constitutional law doctrine did not provide enough space for
national regulation of this sort. In its first case examining a New
Deal law in 1935, the Court invalidated the NIRA’s “hot oil” pro-
vision, which allowed the prohibition of petroleum produced in
excess of quotas.167 Chief Justice Hughes wrote for an 8-1 majority
that the law unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the
President because it gave the President the wide discretion to make
the violations of quotas illegal based on circumstances he deemed
proper.168 That was only a prelude to A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, decided later that year, in which the owners of a
chicken slaughterhouse were prosecuted for violating industrial
codes of conduct—specifically the “live poultry code”—issued pur-
suant to the NIRA.169 The NIRA purported to reach all industrial
production in the country, even the selling of poultry by local
dealers, and it allowed the executive branch to delegate the devel-
opment of industrial codes to trade associations or groups represent-
ing the industries themselves.170 The Schechter Poultry Court found
the NIRA codes unconstitutional in a direct attack on the founda-
tions of the new administrative state.171 First, it held that Congress
had engaged in unconstitutional delegation by allowing the
President to decide how whole industries should operate, limited
only by what he thought was beneficial for the economy.172 Congress
then compounded this problem by allowing trade groups to develop
administrative rules: “Such a delegation of legislative power is
unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitu-
tional prerogatives and duties of Congress,” Chief Justice Hughes
wrote for the Court.173 This ruling threatened the New Deal laws
166. See Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59
HARV. L. REV. 645, 646-47 (1946).
167. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414-20 (1935); see also id. at 436 (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting).
168. See id. at 432-33 (majority opinion).
169. 295 U.S. 495, 519-24 (1935).
170. See National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90 § 3, 48 Stat. 195, 196-97.
171. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541-42.
172. Id. at 537.
173. Id.
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that vested significant lawmaking authority in the executive branch
and the independent agencies.
Schechter Poultry attacked the other principle of the administra-
tive state: that its regulations had to have nationwide scope. The
Court held that the NIRA violated the Constitution’s limits on the
reach of federal economic power, even though 96 percent of the
chickens that were bought and sold in New York City, where
Schechter Poultry operated, came from out of state.174 The owners
of the slaughterhouse bought their goods from interstate wholesal-
ers, but they only sold their chickens to a local market, which did
not directly impact interstate commerce.175 Their activity could not
fall within Congress’s reach because they had not brought the
chickens across state lines themselves, and their only purpose was
to sell the poultry to local buyers.176 If the Court had kept to its
precedent that intrastate manufacturing and agriculture lie outside
of federal authority, more pillars of the New Deal—perhaps even the
whole program itself—might have collapsed. In pointed language,
the Court specifically rejected the Roosevelt administration’s over-
arching approach to the Great Depression: “Extraordinary condi-
tions do not create or enlarge constitutional power.”177
In the spring of 1936, the Court declared unconstitutional more
elements of the New Deal. In United States v. Butler, the Court held
unconstitutional the AAA’s use of taxes and grants to regulate
agricultural production.178 The majority declared that Congress
could not use taxes and spending to regulate intrastate agriculture
because intrastate regulation lay within the reserved powers of the
states.179 Butler also implicated the Social Security Act, which used
a combination of taxes and spending to provide relief and pensions
to the unemployed and elderly.180 In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., a 5-4
majority struck down a 1935 law that set prices, wages, hours, and
collective bargaining rules for the coal industry.181 The Court found
174. Id. at 520.
175. Id. at 521.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 528.
178. 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936).
179. Id. at 60-61.
180. See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 201-02, 302, 49 Stat. 620, 622-23, 626.
181. 298 U.S. 238, 310-11 (1936).
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that the production of coal did not amount to interstate commerce,
and also fell within the reserved powers of the states.182 “[T]he effect
of the labor provisions ... primarily falls upon production and not
upon commerce,” Justice Sutherland wrote for the majority.183
“[P]roduction is a purely local activity.”184 Carter made clear that
Schechter Poultry was not a fluke, so any federal regulation of in-
state industrial production or agriculture was now in constitutional
doubt. In Jones v. SEC, the Justices attacked the proceedings of the
Securities and Exchange Commission as “odious” and “pernicious”
and compared them to the “intolerable abuses of the Star
Chamber.”185 In Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, the Court
found that New York’s minimum wage law violated the Due Process
Clause, just as it had earlier found that such laws interfered with
the right to contract.186 As the Court had already found a federal
minimum wage in the District of Columbia unconstitutional in the
1920s, the Court had made the regulation of wages, in FDR’s words,
a “no-man’s land”—forbidden to both the federal and state govern-
ments.187
After his 1936 reelection, FDR proposed a restructuring of the
Court that would eliminate it as an opponent of the New Deal.188 On
February 5, 1937, FDR sent Congress a judiciary “reform” bill that
would add a new Justice to the Court for every member over the age
of seventy.189 Because of the advanced age of several Justices,
Roosevelt’s proposal would have allowed him to appoint six new
Court members. Rather than criticize the Court for its opposition to
the New Deal, Roosevelt disingenuously claimed that the elderly
Justices were delaying the efficient administration of justice.190 FDR
only indirectly implied a link between the advanced age of the
Justices and their opposition to the New Deal. “Modern complexities
call also for a constant infusion of new blood in the courts,” FDR
182. Id. at 303-04.
183. Id. at 304.
184. Id.
185. 298 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1936).
186. 298 U.S. 587, 609-11, 617-18 (1936).
187. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 103, at 106.
188. See 1937 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 51 (1941)
[hereinafter PUBLIC PAPERS].
189. See id. at 51, 61, 63-66.
190. 81 CONG. REC. 878 (1937).
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wrote.191 “A lowered mental or physical vigor leads men to avoid an
examination of complicated and changed conditions. Little by little,
new facts become blurred through old glasses fitted, as it were, for
the needs of another generation.”192 FDR declared that the remedy
would bring a “constant and systematic addition of younger blood”
that would “vitalize the courts and better equip them to recognize
and apply the essential concepts of justice in the light of the needs
and the facts of an ever-changing world.”193 
Despite his electoral success, FDR’s court-packing plan—the first
domestic initiative of his second term—succumbed to a humiliating
defeat, never coming up for a full vote on the floor of Congress.
Historians and political scientists have argued ever since over
whether FDR still won the war,194 because immediately in the midst
of the struggle in Congress, the Justices made a sharp turn. In
March 1937, the Court handed down a 5-4 decision upholding a
Washington minimum wage law for women.195 In West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish, the lineup of votes for and against New York’s minimum
wage, which had been struck down in Tipaldo the year before,
remained the same—except for Justice Roberts, who switched sides
to uphold Washington’s law.196 In April 1937, the Court upheld the
National Labor Relations Act, which had been challenged on the
same grounds raised in Schechter Poultry and Carter.197 This time,
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., Chief Justice Hughes led
a 5-4 majority in rejecting the doctrine that manufacturing did not
constitute interstate commerce.198 Jones & Laughlin Steel was the
fourth-largest steel company in the nation, with operations in
191. See PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 188, at 55.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, PACKING THE COURT: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL
POWER AND THE COMING CRISIS OF THE SUPREME COURT 153-56 (2009); BARRY CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 11,
30-32 (1998); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 103, at 154-62; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 304-05 (2000).
195. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 388-400 (1937).
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf
Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58
(1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); Wash., Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB,
301 U.S. 142 (1937).
198. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 41.
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multiple states.199 As the Court observed, “the stoppage of those
operations by industrial strife would have a most serious effect
upon interstate commerce.”200 “It is obvious,” the Court found, that
the effect “would be immediate and might be catastrophic.”201
Henceforth the Court would allow federal regulation of the economy,
even of wholly intrastate activity, because of the interconnectedness
of the national market. To do otherwise would be to “shut our eyes
to the plainest facts of our national life” and to judge questions of
interstate commerce “in an intellectual vacuum.”202 
Although FDR lost in Congress, he had won his larger objective.
The Supreme Court would not strike down another federal law that
regulated interstate commerce for almost sixty years. Journalists
and political scientists immediately attributed the “switch in time
that saved nine” to FDR’s threat to pack the Court.203 Even today,
creative scholars defend the sweeping constitutional changes of the
New Deal—which, unlike Reconstruction, was never written into a
constitutional amendment—by citing the 1936 electoral landslide
and the attack on the Court.204 More recent work argues that the
Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine was evolving in a more generous
direction toward federal power, irrespective of FDR’s actions.205 For
our purposes, identifying the precipitating cause of the “switch in
time that saved nine” is not as important as the context within
which it occurred. The political branches and the judiciary reached
a confrontation over the Constitution because existing doctrine
could not grapple with the effects of economic and social nationaliza-
tion. In cases such as Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Court’s view of the
economy ignored the transportation and communications advances
that had knitted the states and regions into a national market.206 Its
view that manufacturing and production were distinct and sepa-
rate from interstate commerce placed strict limits on the national
199. Id. at 26.
200. Id. at 41.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938); MERLO J. PUSEY,
THE SUPREME COURT CRISIS 51-53 (1937).
204. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 105-30 (1991).
205. See CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 195-206.
206. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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government’s ability to regulate the economy during the Great
Depression.207 In cases such as Schechter Poultry, the Court placed
limits on the structure of the administrative state that grew in
response to the nationalization of the economy.208 Constitutional law
had failed to keep up with the demands of the twentieth century.
The results were a destructive confrontation between the President
and the Court, in which both arguably lost in the short term, and a
constitutional law that lifted almost all restraint on the regulatory
powers of the administrative state.
III. GLOBALIZATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION
If history provides any guidance, we might expect a confrontation
again among the branches of government unless constitutional law
adapts to globalization. On one side of the equation, globalization
has prompted government responses similar in form to those that
arose with nationalization. Although national economic and social
activity comfortably falls within the federal government’s regulatory
grasp, existing constitutional law doctrines cannot easily accommo-
date the broader demands of international regulation. The political
branches and the courts have not thought through how best to adapt
the U.S. legal system to mediate between its constitutional struc-
ture and global governance. In this Part, we describe how the ten-
sion between international regulation and the Constitution both
resembles the confrontation of the New Deal but also, in important
respects, exceeds it.
Multilateral efforts to regulate globalized activity mirror the
administrative state’s efforts to extend into both public and private
conduct. The CWC attempts to regulate all possession and produc-
207.  Id. at 272 (“Over interstate transportation, or its incidents, the regulatory power of
Congress is ample, but the production of articles, intended for interstate commerce, is a
matter of local regulation.”).
208. 295 U.S. 495, 549-50 (1935) (“Our growth and development have called for wide use
of the commerce power of the federal government in its control over the expanded activities
of interstate commerce and in protecting that commerce from burdens, interferences, and
conspiracies to restrain and monopolize it. But the authority of the federal government may
not be pushed to such an extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the commerce clause
itself establishes, between commerce ‘among the several States’ and the internal concerns of
a state.”).
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tion of specified chemicals.209 A global warming agreement would
reach most, if not all, forms of energy production and use in the
United States.210 This reach, however, conflicts with the Supreme
Court’s recent efforts to limit Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.
As interpreted by the courts, the Clause gives Congress broad
authority to regulate the movement of goods, people, services, and
intangible goods. Congress can prohibit certain articles in interstate
commerce, even if its true motive was to regulate the intrastate
activities that resulted in their production.211 Congress can even
regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce,
even if those activities are wholly intrastate and even if their
individual impact is trivial, so long as Congress has a rational basis
for concluding that their consequences are substantial in the
aggregate.212 
Under Commerce Clause doctrine as it had existed prior to 1995,
the broad sweep of treaty regimes like the CWC would not have
given courts much pause. After the New Deal revolution, the
Supreme Court had not found any federal law to exceed the limits
of the Clause, and Congress, not surprisingly, resorted to this power
to regulate a wide variety of subjects, including discrimination,213
individual rights,214 crime,215 the environment,216 and food and drug
safety.217 But beginning in 1995, the Rehnquist Court imposed limi-
tations on what had become the most sweeping aspect of the
Commerce Clause: its application to conduct that had “substantial
effects” on interstate commerce.218 In United States v. Lopez, the
Court held unconstitutional a federal law that banned handguns
209. See CWC, supra note 15.
210. See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 12.
211. See, e.g., Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 359-60 (1914);
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1913); Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188
U.S. 321, 360 (1903).
212. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119-20
(1941). 
213. See, e.g, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964).
214. See, e.g., Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 308, 317 (1964).
215. See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575-77 (1977).
216. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 282-83
(1981).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432, 437-38 (1947).
218. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565-66 (1995).
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near school zones because the conduct lacked an essentially
economic character and the guns had not traveled through inter-
state commerce.219 First, the handgun law was “a criminal statute
that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of
economic enterprise,” the Court concluded.220 A second important
point for the Court was that the link between handgun possession
and interstate commerce was too attenuated to justify federal regu-
lation.221 If the Court allowed regulation of handgun possession
because handguns caused violence that harmed economic productiv-
ity, it would be “hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual
that Congress is without power to regulate.”222
In United States v. Morrison, the Court held that Congress could
not provide a civil remedy for gender-motivated violence that oc-
curred wholly within one state.223 It reasoned again that the activity
had no commercial character, did not involve the crossing of state
borders, and could not be considered to affect interstate commerce
in the aggregate.224 This recent jurisprudence, however, explicitly
reaffirmed and left wholly unqualified the other two “broad cate-
gories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce
power”: the “channels” and the “instrumentalities” of interstate
commerce.225 Neither Lopez nor Morrison involved a statute that
included a jurisdictional element or “jurisdictional nexus” in which
the subject of federal policy is, has been, or perhaps will be in the
“channels” of interstate commerce. As a consequence, the Court has
given no indication of how elastic this category might be to insulate
similar legislation from constitutional invalidation.
Still, the lines drawn by Lopez and Morrison would seem to ex-
clude some activities from international regulation when pursued
by the federal government through the Commerce Clause. For
example, if the regulation of marriage is considered noneconomic
conduct, then it would not benefit from the aggregation principle of
Wickard v. Filburn. Although the Court did not draw a bright line
219. Id. at 567.
220. Id. at 561.
221. Id. at 567.
222. Id. at 564.
223. 529 U.S. 598, 617-19, 626-27 (2000). 
224. Id. 
225. Id. at 608-09 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558).
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in Morrison against aggregation in such cases, it observed that the
aggregation principle has only been held to operate in areas of a
commercial character.226 In other words, Congress cannot add up all
of the individual economic effects that a regulated conduct may have
on interstate commerce to justify national regulation of intrastate
activity. This principle was not disturbed by the Court’s recent
decision in Gonzales v. Raich, which upheld regulation of a purely
intrastate activity even though the Court conceded that it was not
“commercial.”227 The Justices held that the federal prohibition of
intrastate cultivation and use of marijuana, even when permitted
by state law for medicinal purposes, was subject to the aggregation
approach because Congress had a rational basis for the effective
regulation of the interstate market and traffic in illicit drugs, a
quintessentially economic activity.228
Another important limitation on Congress’s regulation of intra-
state activity arises when the conduct falls within an area of
“traditional state concern.”229 First raised in Justice Kennedy’s con-
currence in Lopez and then incorporated into the majority opinion
in Morrison, this concept precludes Commerce Clause regulation
into areas historically considered to be subject to state regulation.230
The underlying offense in both Lopez and Morrison was criminal in
nature, which came within the state’s police power.231 This incursion
prompted Justice Kennedy to worry that “[w]ere the Federal
Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional
state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of
commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of
federal and state authority would blur.”232 In Lopez, the majority
identified specific areas—“family law (including marriage, divorce,
and child custody) ... criminal law enforcement [and] education ... [in
226. See id. at 610-11.
227. 545 U.S. 1, 18-19 (2005).
228. Id. at 22, 25.
229. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611.
230. Id. at 610-11 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 573-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
231. See id. at 618 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566).
232. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy contended that if
the line of demarcation between the federal government and the states were blurred, “political
responsibility would become illusory,” and “[t]he resultant inability to hold either branch of
the government answerable to the citizens [would be] more dangerous even than devolving
too much authority to the remote central power.” Id.
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which] States historically have been sovereign.”233 In both opinions,
Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed the concern that “if we were to
accept the Government's arguments [to sustain congressional
power], we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual
that Congress is without power to regulate.”234
Modern international cooperation will run into these limits on
federal power because it requires comprehensive regulation of all
public and private conduct in a certain category of activity. Much
domestic conduct would fall within federal regulation, but signifi-
cant portions might not. In the case of chemicals, for example,
Congress could implement the CWC’s prohibition with regard to
industries and businesses operating in interstate commerce.235 The
more difficult question is whether federal power could reach chem-
icals produced or possessed by private individuals who themselves
are not operating in the national markets and cause no “substantial
effect” on interstate commerce. Gonzales v. Raich, which upheld the
Controlled Substances Act’s prohibition on marijuana possession,
suggests that Congress might have the power in the case of chem-
icals.236 “Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is
not in itself ‘commercial,’” the Court declared, “if it concludes that
failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regula-
tion of the interstate market in that commodity.”237 It could be
argued that the regulation of chemicals held by individuals with no
intention of sale or transportation across state borders would still
fall within federal power because it substantially affects the rele-
vant national market.
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, however,
might not extend to other types of international cooperation. Energy
use, in contrast to chemicals, is not fully regulated by the national
government nor significantly produced within private homes for a
national market. It is doubtful, for example, that federal regulation
could extend to home production or consumption of energy that
occurs off of the electric grid, such as wood-burning fireplaces and
233. Id. at 564 (majority opinion). 
234. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564).
235. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
236. 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
237. Id. at 18.
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home generators. Accepting federal power over home energy use
would truly test the principle in Morrison and Lopez that the courts
cannot allow the Commerce Clause to reach every form of human
conduct.238 An international treaty regulating gun possession, to
which the United States has objected on Second Amendment
grounds, would raise similar problems. If such a treaty were to re-
quire the criminalization of the possession of certain weapons, the
legislation would involve the same doubts that caused the Court to
strike down the federal handgun law in Lopez.239 Human rights
treaties, which seek to establish rights that go beyond those re-
quired by the Bill of Rights, involve the same difficulties. It would
be difficult to conclude that expanded individual rights would
involve interstate commerce or commercial activity. Indeed, they
would resemble most closely the type of law invalidated in Morrison,
which sought to expand federal protections against gender-moti-
vated violence.240 
Even if the Commerce Clause might accommodate the broad
scope of international regulatory treaties, their demands could still
cause federalism problems of a second sort. In areas clearly within
federal power, Congress cannot impose standards that violate the
reserved powers or rights of states as independent political entities
within the federal system. In New York v. United States241 and
Printz v. United States,242 the Court invalidated federal laws that
sought to “commandeer” state officers into performing federal
legislative or executive functions.243 The federal government, for ex-
ample, can regulate nuclear waste, but it cannot force states to
enact legislation adopting its preferred regulations.244 Congress can
require background checks before the purchase of a handgun, but it
cannot require state officials to carry out the checks.245 These
principles effectively prevent the federal government from shifting
the financial and political costs of carrying out its programs. The
238. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564).
239. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
240. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-02.
241. 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
242. 521 U.S. 898, 917 (1997).
243. Id. at 917; see also New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
244. See New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
245. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933.
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same would apply, it seems, for treaties as well as statutes. The
national government could not require state officials to implement
treaty requirements, such as conducting searches of chemical
facilities or passing state legislation to enforce a treaty.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs)246 provides an illustration of the conflict between
international regimes and the sovereignty of American states.
Under TRIPs, which itself is part of the WTO agreement, state
parties agreed to establish minimum substantive protections for
intellectual property and to provide for judicial remedies, including
compensatory relief, against infringers.247 The Supreme Court’s re-
cent expansion of the protections for states against private lawsuits
for damages would prevent full remedies when state governments
have violated intellectual property rights. Under Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, for example, Congress may not provide a remedy in federal
court for damages against a State,248 and under Alden v. Maine, the
same is true in state court.249 Even when Congress had used its
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than
its Commerce Clause power under Article I, to protect an individ-
ual’s intellectual property rights, the Court has invalidated compre-
hensive federal statutes without a showing of systematic state vio-
lations of those rights.250 These decisions appear to place the United
States in violation of TRIPs by eliminating judicial remedies for
violations of intellectual property rights against a class of potential
infringers.251 
International regimes create equally difficult problems with the
separation of powers. Multilateral treaties and their delegation of
authority to new organizations raise the issue of delegation in much
the same way that the New Deal did. Vesting authority in the CWC,
for example, to prohibit the production or possession of specific
246. See WTO Agreement, supra note 19, Annex 1C.
247. See id.
248. 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996).
249. 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).
250. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 647 (1999).
251. See Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity From
Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1452-53
(2000).
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chemicals, raises the same issue as the delegation of similar auth-
ority to federal agencies. Under current doctrine, Congress may
transfer rule-making power to the agencies so long as it has stated
an objective, prescribed method to achieve it, and articulated in-
telligible standards to guide administrative discretion.252 These
standards prohibit Congress from delegating its legislative power
and provide courts with a loose way to evaluate whether the
agencies have exercised their authority legally. They keep Congress
involved in the formulation of policy and accountable to the elec-
torate for its choices. Although the Court has not invalidated a
congressional delegation since Carter v. Carter Coal Co., it continues
to observe that Congress cannot transfer lawmaking without mean-
ingful standards.253
At first glance, delegation of rule-making authority to IOs would
seem to be consistent with these principles. Multilateral treaties
usually focus on discrete areas, and the rule-making authority of
international institutions is usually circumscribed with standards
that are narrower than those used with the American adminis-
trative state. There is an important twist, however, created by the
need to vest rule-making authority in neutral, independent inter-
national institutions. In the case of IOs, the delegation runs not
from Congress to the executive branch but from the United States
to an institution that does not fall within the national or state
governments. This creates serious problems for the underlying
mechanisms that police delegations. Congress cannot enforce its
standards through the usual legal or political methods when the
recipient of the delegated power is not responsible to Congress, the
President, or any other federal authority. Congress has no ready
means of monitoring and influencing the performance of interna-
tional officials or of measuring their conduct against intelligible
standards. Delegation to IOs also might allow Congress to sidestep
the checks on its own lawmaking authority. Bicameralism and
presentment promote transparency and accountability in the
252. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 423-24 (1944).
253. 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); see also, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-
27 (2001); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); Yakus, 321 U.S. at 423-24.
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exercise of legislative authority.254 Even when legislative authority
is transferred to agencies, executive branch officers remain crea-
tures of the national government and subject to the discipline of the
political process.255 Delegation to private parties, the Court held in
the 1930s, undermines the public nature of federal power and risks
the capture of government policy by private interests.256 
International regimes may also raise a second type of delegation
problem. We have discussed the case when Congress delegates its
authority to another domestic governmental actor, the source of
most academic commentary on delegation.257 A second case occurs
when Congress attempts to transfer authority from one of the other
branches to a different entity. The independent counsel law presents
a good case of this type of delegation.258 There, Congress vested in
254. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2323-25
(2001).
255. See id. at 2323.
256. See Carter, 298 U.S. at 311.
257. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
131-34 (1980); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE
TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 152 (1997); MARTIN REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL
STRUCTURE 135-61 (1995); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the
Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1300 (2003);
Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1383-84 (1996); Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109
YALE L.J. 1399, 1415-16 (2000); Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper”
Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 236-37 (2005); Gary
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231-33
(1994); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 223, 223, 277; Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation
to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2101, 2163 (2004); Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1741 (2002); Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331, 1331-32
(2003); David Schoenbrod, Politics and the Principle that Elected Legislators Should Make the
Laws, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 258-60 (2003); Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and
Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781-82 (1999);
Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
821, 823 (1990); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1695-96 (1975); Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?,
98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 309, 336 (1999).
258. See generally Symposium, The Independent Counsel Act: From Watergate to
Whitewater and Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 2011 (1998) (incorporating contributions by Jerome J.
Shestack, Michael R. Bromwich, George D. Brown, Samuel Dash, Katy J. Harriger, Philip B.
Heymann, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Norman J. Ornstein, Julie R. O’Sullivan, Cass R. Sunstein,
Arthur H. Christy, Joseph E. diGenova, Donald C. Smaltz, and Lawrence E. Walsh).
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the independent counsel the authority to investigate and prosecute
federal crimes allegedly committed by high-ranking members of the
cabinet agencies and the White House, and protected the counsel
from removal by the President except “for cause.”259 In Morrison v.
Olson, the Court upheld the delegation because the counsel was an
inferior officer who remained subject to the direction of the Attorney
General, even if he or she could not be removed at will.260 But when
Congress transfers law execution authority to agents completely
outside the control of the executive branch, as occurred in Bowsher
v. Synar, the Supreme Court has found the delegation unconstitu-
tional.261 
As we have seen, the Appointments Clause has become the
battleground for struggles between the President and Congress
over the power to enforce federal law. Delegations to international
institutions, however, raise a different problem, addressed only by
Buckley v. Valeo’s discussion of the Clause. Buckley found unconsti-
tutional the Federal Elections Commission, created by Congress in
1974 to enforce the campaign finance laws, because Congress se-
lected four commissioners.262 According to the Court, commissioners
exercised power under federal law, and so were considered officers
of the United States.263 All officers, the Court held, were subject to
the Appointments Clause, which gives the President the authority
to nominate and appoint officers subject to the advice and consent
of the Senate.264 For an inferior officer, the Clause allows Congress
to vest appointment in the President alone, in department heads, or
in the courts.265 Buckley described the Clause as “a deliberate
change made by the Framers with the intent to deny Congress any
authority itself to appoint those who were ‘Officers of the United
States.’”266 In subsequent cases, the Court has emphasized that the
Appointments Clause “is among the significant structural safe-
259. See Jerome J. Shestack, Foreword: The Independent Counsel Act Revisited, 86 GEO.
L.J. 2011, 2013-14, 2018 (1998).
260. 487 U.S. 654, 691-92 (1988).
261. 478 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986).
262. 424 U.S. 1, 126-27, 140 (1976).
263. Id. at 127-28.
264. Id. at 132.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 129.
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guards of the constitutional scheme” because it “prevents congres-
sional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches.”267
In the words of the Court: “[The Clause] preserves another aspect
of the Constitution’s structural integrity by preventing the diffusion
of the appointment power.”268 The Clause makes the appointments
process public to prevent the diversion of power to individuals not
accountable to the political branches and, ultimately, the elec-
torate.269 “The structural interests protected by the Appointments
Clause are not those of any one branch of Government but of the
entire Republic,” the Court has said, and therefore, “[n]either
Congress nor the Executive can agree to waive this structural
protection.”270
Placing the enforcement of multilateral treaties in the hands of
IOs will run afoul of these structural limitations. The CWC, for ex-
ample, grants the power to search American chemical facilities to
officials of the CWC Technical Secretariat.271 They are not selected
under the Appointments Clause, they are not members of the
executive branch, and they are not accountable to the President or
to Congress. Yet, they may potentially exercise public authority by
choosing the location for searches and carrying them out, while
federal law prohibits private citizens from interfering.272 If the
federal government were to conduct similar searches, it would have
to choose officers of the United States, chosen under the Appoint-
ments Clause, to carry out the searches; furthermore, those officials
would have to operate according to the Fourth Amendment, which
itself is enforced by the courts.273 CWC officials, by contrast, are not
responsible to any American officials and are not accountable for
their actions to the national government. Indeed, their very reason
for being is to enforce the CWC without the influence of any single
nation. Though necessary to create a multilateral inspection regime,
the independence of the CWC organization raises delegation
267. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997).
268. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S.
868, 878 (1991)).
269. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 884.
270. Id. at 880.
271. See CWC, supra note 15, art. V.
272. See 22 U.S.C. § 6726 (2006).
273. See Yoo, supra note 21, at 117-19.
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problems that compound those that arose for the New Deal agen-
cies.
A third variant of the delegation issue centers on the judiciary.
Congress can violate the separation of powers by vesting the
authority to decide cases in tribunals located in the executive
branch or in independent agencies rather than the federal courts.
The Court has allowed some vesting of adjudicatory authority in
non-Article III courts but only if they do not undermine the consti-
tutional role of the federal judiciary.274 With the administrative
state, this problem has arisen when Congress has created rights
under new statutory schemes, such as the review of the denial of
welfare benefits, or when Congress transfers causes of action from
the jurisdiction of federal courts to those of the administrative
agencies. Scholars regularly observe that the Court’s jurisprudence
on this question is unclear.275 Congress cannot transfer the author-
ity to hear questions of constitutional law or private rights from the
Article III courts to an administrative tribunal. It can, however, vest
some adjudicative authority in the agencies, and has done so from
the beginning of the Republic.276 Today, such courts handle takings,
tax, and bankruptcy claims, for example. Again, as with the dele-
gation of legislative authority, even when Congress vests the adjud-
icative function outside the branch originally given that authority
under the Constitution, here the judiciary, that function still rests
within the national government.
The spread of international tribunals and jurisdiction over private
claims places stress on this framework. A leading example comes
from NAFTA, which creates arbitral panels to hear disputes over
dumping, which is the export of goods at prices below cost.277 Before
NAFTA, private parties could bring cases claiming dumping by a
competitor to the Secretary of Commerce and the International
274. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856-57 (1986).
275. See generally Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN.
L. REV. 329 (1991); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
559 (2007); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982); Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of
Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1982).
276. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III,
101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 919-26 (1988).
277. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex. arts. 1901-05, Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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Trade Commission, whose decisions were reviewable in the Court
of International Trade, an Article III court subject to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court.278
Under NAFTA, a private party can only appeal a decision of the ITC
or the Secretary of Commerce to a NAFTA tribunal rather than the
federal courts.279 NAFTA thus transfers claims under federal law
that were once heard in federal court to non-U.S. courts. The
International Criminal Court, which the United States has yet to
join, requires member nations to turn over suspects of war crimes
for trial.280 In the context of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations281 and the death penalty, foreign nations no doubt have
more faith that the International Court of Justice will extend
greater neutrality in its decision on whether a foreign defendant’s
rights under international treaty have been respected than they will
that the courts of Texas or Oklahoma will do the same.282
Vesting adjudicative authority in international tribunals can,
under certain circumstances, promote international cooperation.
International tribunals can identify whether a state party has vio-
lated the terms of an international agreement and measure possible
remedies without any bias that could be associated with domestic
courts.283 But these tribunals’ very independence and neutrality
cause problems with Article III of the Constitution. As with the
other delegations studied here, the international dimension only
compounds the nature of the problem. Even if a cause of action can
be moved outside of the cognizance of the Article III courts, it is still
heard within the American governmental system in a specialized
Article I court or an administrative agency. Those two types of tri-
bunals will still be accountable for their decisions to the administra-
278. See Ku, supra note 21, at 111.
279. See id.; see also Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The Unconstitutionality of
Binational Arbitral Review Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1455, 1458-63 (1992).
280. ICC Statute, supra note 20.
281. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261.
282. See, e.g., Brief for the European Union and Members of the International Community
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633),
2004 WL 1619203.
283. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals,
93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 12-14 (2005).
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tive agency, the executive branch, or ultimately Congress. They will
generally be subject in their procedures to the requirements of the
Due Process Clause. An international tribunal, however, is not
accountable to the U.S. government and need not follow consti-
tutional norms of fair process in their proceedings. As with the
Appointments Clause, Article III displays a strong suspicion of
congressional efforts to transfer power away from another branch.
Shifting adjudicative authority to international courts creates
tensions with this principle, but then adds the additional difficulty
that the power is moved wholly outside the national government.
CONCLUSION
We should not be misread as attacking the movement toward
international cooperation. Rather, our goal here has been to show
that the forms of the new international law raise deep structural
problems for our constitutional system of government. In some
cases, the comprehensive sweep of international regulatory regimes
pushes the reach of federal power beyond the limits of the Com-
merce Clause or into the reserved powers of the states. In other
cases, international cooperation may require the delegation of
rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication functions to independent
IOs in ways that create tensions with the Constitution’s protections
for the separation of powers.
These questions are not wholly new. They have occurred before,
as when the President and Congress enacted the sweeping laws
of the New Deal. In response to the Great Depression, Congress
transferred broad legislative authority to the executive branch and
independent agencies. This new administrative state ran into a
head-on conflict with the Supreme Court’s formalist doctrines on
both federalism and the separation of powers. Because constitu-
tional law had not kept pace with the changes wrought by the
nationalization of the American economy and society, the political
branches and the courts collided. Constitutional law gave way, but
at a high cost in legitimacy for the President and the Supreme
Court. A better understanding of the ways in which law can mediate
between the similar demands of globalization and international
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regulation, on the one hand, and the Constitution on the other, may
help prevent a similar conflict in the near future. 
Before finishing with our discussion of the tension between
globalization and the Constitution’s structural provisions, we should
make a normative point. At the beginning of this essay, we sought
to define federalism and the separation of powers in the Constitu-
tion, and in the latter half, we identified the problems created by
globalization for its structure. If the American people, however,
decided to amend the Constitution to alter these fundamental
constitutional principles, these conflicts would begin to disappear.
One question that concerns us is that these choices should not be
made gradually by the courts, but rather through constitutional
mechanisms that grant the decisions on accommodating globaliza-
tion to the elected branches of government and, ultimately, the
electorate. But it is always possible that the American people, as in
Europe, could decide to weaken different aspects of their Constitu-
tion to make international cooperation easier. They could amend the
Constitution, for example, to allow for the explicit delegation of
judicial power to international tribunals such as the International
Criminal Court.
We openly confess our view, however, that any fundamental
change in the Constitution’s structures would be a terrible mistake.
Putting aside their historical pedigrees, we think that federalism
and the separation of powers today guarantee a number of norma-
tive benefits for the United States. Federalism, for example, creates
policy competition among states; citizens can maximize their pre-
ferences by choosing to live in states with policies that they prefer.
States such as California can provide high levels of environmental
protection at the cost of lower rates of industrial growth; individuals
who enjoy the outdoors over high-paying manufacturing jobs or
lower taxes can move there. Federalism also encourages innovation
in government policy—states serve as fifty “laboratories of democ-
racy” that conduct experiments for solving social problems, which
will lead to more effective national solutions. Finally, federalism
allows for the more effective provision of public goods—or certain
benefits, such as schools, roads, regional transportation systems,
parks, and law enforcement—which affect smaller geographic
units rather than the nation as a whole. Federalism has signif-
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icant advantages above and beyond its historical presence in the
Constitution.
The separation of powers also provides significant benefits beyond
the happy accident of its inclusion in the Constitution. Dividing
legislative power between the two houses of Congress and the
President demands that a high level of consensus exist before the
government enacts new domestic legislation. As the level of con-
sensus increases, the law is more likely to express the will of the
majority and to represent better judgment on the right trade-offs for
society. Multiple hurdles for the legislative process reduce the
chance that special interest groups will use domestic regulation to
capture benefits for themselves at the public’s expense. At the same
time, the separation of powers encourages the vigorous exercise of
national powers at the right moment. For example, the President
can lead the nation into war, protect the national security, or con-
duct foreign affairs with “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch,”
in the words of Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 70.284 By
openly allocating power to the branch best suited for its exercise, the
separation of powers encourages accountability to the electorate,
which knows which political actors are responsible for success or
failures on the field. Finally, the separation of powers provides a
safeguard for liberty: it makes it difficult for any one party or group
to take over the controls of government altogether, and gives each
branch the means to frustrate the plans of the others. 
Scholars argue over whether the Constitution’s structures have
produced a political stability that is responsible for the nation’s
success. We tend to think that they have. America’s decentralized
government, both between the national and state governments and
among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, discourages
a rush into radical reforms or sweeping alterations of the basic rules
of the political system. The American Constitution may allow
grievous injustices—such as slavery and segregation—to persist for
long periods of time, but it also creates a risk-averse political system
that prevents the United States from swinging wildly or hastily in
one direction or another. Altering federalism and the separation of
powers to allow for greater international cooperation may seem
284. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 28, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton).
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desirable now, but the long-term benefits may not exceed the costs,
if those costs are likely to be the weakening of those governing
principles in domestic affairs. Instead, the American system can
accommodate the demands of globalization within existing doctrines
of the separation of powers and federalism, though with some
difficulty. We think that accommodation, even with the higher
transaction costs of congressional action or less centralization over
policy, is worth the price to preserve the constitutional principles
that have served the nation so well, and for so long.
